The Last Word
Trust No One at the Airport
By Arnold Barnett
It's always something. Because of Congress and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the United States at last has a world-class system of airline passenger and baggage screening. But now, TSA is embarking on questionable projects that could exempt large numbers of travelers from many of the new security measures.
The idea is that "low risk" passengers and their bags do not need the same level of scrutiny as those whose risk level is either high or unknown. One program would allow "trusted travelers" who have submitted to and passed background checks to bypass much of the physical screening at airports. (The phrase "trusted travelers" has been replaced by TSA with "registered travelers," to avoid directly suggesting that some passengers cannot be trusted.) Another initiative would reduce screening for those passengers designated low-risk under a computer-based profiling scheme (CAPPS II).
Let's focus here on the trusted-traveler program. Those so designated would receive what was the standard level of screening prior to 9/11. Thus, their carry-on bags would get only a quick scan at the metal detector, while they themselves would be about as likely to be asked to remove their shoes as to undergo open-heart surgery.
In the abstract, the idea is not preposterous: We use background checks to decide who gets a top-secret security clearance, so why can't we use them to verify that a given passenger is not a terrorist? The problem arises in trying to implement the program. Suppose that I am a management consultant and am denied "trusted" status, while my colleagues who travel with me are granted it. Observing our differential treatment at airports, they might wonder "what is it about this guy that leads the government to suspect him?" As a good American, I might rapidly file a lawsuit charging TSA with having besmirched my reputation (and having caused me great mental anguish).
Suppose further that the reason I was refused was that I was very late paying back a college loan. (Given that TSA envisions an appeals process, the reasons for denial would presumably be revealed.) My lawyer could argue that there is no empirical evidence linking college-loan deadbeats and acts of terror; hence, TSA had been arbitrary and capricious. A judge might agree, and order that I be granted trusted-traveler status. Under a torrent of such lawsuits, many original rejection criteria in the program could be chipped away, not all of them frivolous.
Moreover, TSA has promised that ethnic profiling will play no role in the program. That general principle could have broad ramifications. Because of terrorist activity in (say) the Philippines, TSA might be reluctant to trust people who have traveled there. But the overwhelming majority of such travelers might be Americans of Philippine descent who are visiting their ancestral home. To reject them because of their itineraries but not Italian-Americans who go to Italy could be viewed as ethnic profiling by proxy. As such, it might be forbidden.
In short, the program might operate under such constraints that one would practically require graduate work with Al Qaeda to be denied trusted-traveler status. Under those circumstances, individuals tied to terrorist groups might be emboldened to apply for the status. And, if they succeed, they will be guaranteed in advance that their airport screening will be cursory.
Moreover, the rationale for the program was that frequent flyers could not endure the delays and hassles brought on by post 9/11 airport processing. But the situation has been changing dramatically. On the Wednesday before Thanksgiving in 2002 — the second busiest travel day of the year — passenger screening delays almost everywhere averaged below 10 minutes. (A TSA spokesman said the Miami International Airport security lines were shorter than those at the Lotto counter.) And the physical screening of checked luggage, introduced on Jan. 1 of this year has caused little difficulty, even under provisional conditions that could exacerbate delays.
There is more. Frequent flyers can now stand on separate, shorter queues at airport screening points (though they get the usual level of scrutiny once there). And the last-minute screenings at boarding gates that caused great frustration to many travelers are being drastically reduced. The upshot is that the trusted-traveler program is a response to a problem that has already largely dissipated.
How does it all add up? Giving great gains in airport efficiency, the benefits of the program are unlikely to be huge. And there is no way to quantify the risk that, because of the program, it will be easier for terrorists to destroy airplanes. (TSA is initiating a pilot project, but no such project could demonstrate that the program's "false negative" rate is essentially zero.) Thus, a trusted-traveler program is unlikely to be supported by any convincing cost/benefit analysis.
While First Lady, Nancy Reagan famously urged teenagers tempted by drugs to "just say no." The trusted-travelers program has considerable momentum behind it, but it is not too late for us to take a deep breath, do the right thing, and just say no.
Arnold Barnett, the George Eastman Professor of Management Science at MIT, has conducted aviation safety research for nearly 25 years. He has also worked as a consultant to 13 airlines, five airports and the FAA. In 1997, NBC News described him as "the nation's leading expert about the safety of air travel."
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