Operations Research Management Science - Lichtman's 13 Keys

<BODY bgcolor="#ffffff" link="cc0000" vlink="cc0000" text="#000000"> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br>   <table border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0 width=480><tr valign=top> <td width=10><img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 hspace=4 border=0></td> <td width=470> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><B><I><A HREF="../../ORMS.shtml" TARGET="_top">OR/MS Today</A> - February 2004</I></B></font><BR> <hr size="1"> <img src="cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <font face="times new roman, times"> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><B>Lichtman's 13 Keys</B></FONT><br> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <FONT SIZE="+2"><B>Does OR Hold the Keys to the White House?</B></FONT><BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> <FONT SIZE="+1"><I>The 2004 presidential election: do long-term patterns dictate the outcome? Quantitative historian Allan Lichtman uses OR techniques to predict elections.</I></FONT><BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><B>By Douglas A. Samuelson</B></FONT><br> <hr size="1"> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br>    The presidential campaign is in full swing, and the outcome is very much up in the air  or is it? At least a couple of analysts, using OR/MS techniques, claim they have models and information that cut through irrelevant data and focus on the really critical predictors. <P>Allan J. Lichtman's "Thirteen Keys" indicate that President George W. Bush will be reelected unless at least two of five apparently unlikely things happen: a recession, a major scandal, an explosion of social unrest, the emergence of a highly charismatic challenger, and a perception that there has been no military or foreign-policy success during the term  in other words, setback and stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan, negating the effect of the quick victories over conventional forces there. <P><I>OR/MS Today</I> readers may remember Lichtman, professor of history at The American University in Washington, D.C., from the 2000 presidential election [<I><a href="../orms-10-00/samuelson.html">OR/MS Today,</I> Vol. 27. No. 5, October 2000</a>]. <P>Up until the last weekend of the 2000 election, most polls and analyses indicated a Bush victory in the popular vote and a razor-thin contest in electoral votes, perhaps producing a win for Gore despite a loss in the popular vote. Only two sources got Gore's popular vote victory right  the last Zogby poll the weekend before the election and Lichtman's "Thirteen Keys" model  a year in advance! <P>Lichtman authored the popular book, "The Keys to the White House" [1996], updated and reissued to include the analysis of the 1996 election and predictions for 2000. His forecast of a Gore victory in the popular vote is on record at least as early as September 1999, when he stated, "There are five keys against the incumbent party at this time. If the Democrats have a serious contest for the nomination, they will lose; otherwise, they will win." By July, the prediction was firm, as reported in the <a href="../orms-10-00/samuelson.html">October 2000</a> issue of <I>OR/MS Today.</I> Lichtman's predictions are based on 13 questions (<A HREF="#keys">see box</A>), each with a "yes" or "no" answer. "Yes" answers favor the incumbent party. If five or fewer answers are "no," the incumbent party retains the presidency; if six or more are "no," the challenger wins. <P>For the 2004 election, Lichtman says the Republicans have lost Key 6 (long-term economic growth has slowed since the Clinton years), Key 7 (there were no significant policy changes during this term), Key 10 (there was a major military or foreign-policy failure) and Key 12 (the incumbent-party candidate is not very charismatic or a national hero). Key 11, the major military or foreign-policy success, "looks to be there now because of the victories in Afghanistan and Iraq and the capture of Saddam Hussein, but it's shaky," Lichtman explains. "If we get bogged down and seem to be stalled, that key could still fall." <P>Obviously, some keys require interpretation. In 1992, Lichtman called the "recession" key, Key 5, as lost for Bush even though subsequent analysis indicated the recession had ended in the summer. "The perception was there during the campaign, and that's what counts," Lichtman says. <P>In 2000, Gore retained Key 4, the third-party key, because no candidate got five percent of the vote nationwide even though third-party candidate Ralph Nader may well have tipped Florida to Bush. This year, for Key 7, the Medicare overhaul and the changes in criminal justice are "revisions of existing programs, not major changes in the whole direction of policy," Lichtman explains. "It's not like the Great Society or the Reagan Revolution." <P>For Key 11, Lichtman says, "If you had to count Pearl Harbor, you have to count 9/11." <P>And for Key 13, challenger charisma, Lichtman advises that, "Five candidates turned this key in the 20th Century: the two Roosevelts, Eisenhower because he was a major war hero, Kennedy and Reagan. Kerry and Clark have impressive war records and Edwards is a strong campaigner, but I don't see any of them creating the kind of impact those five had."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=3><B>Not Just Theory, Statistical Science</B></FONT><BR> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> Lichtman emphasizes that his method is based on a solid statistical model that incorporates a test of competing theories of politics, and the prediction results validate some of the theories and contradict others. The "keys" are based on a statistical pattern recognition algorithm for predicting earthquakes, implemented by Russian seismologist Volodia Keilis-Borok. In English-language terminology, the technique most closely resembles kernel discriminate function analysis. The highest plurality of the popular vote, not the electoral vote which actually decides the presidency, is the criterion, which means that in three elections 1876, 1888 and 2000  the "winner" as defined in this method did not end up as president. Out of nearly 200 questions, which were all binary ("yes" or "no") variables, the algorithm picked those that displayed the greatest difference between the proportion of the time the variable was "yes" for years when the incumbent party won and the corresponding proportion for years when the challenging party won, using all U. S. elections from 1860 through 1976 as the training set. Interestingly, the single most powerful variable was the key that turned out to be critical in 2000  the presence or absence of a significant contest for the incumbent-party nomination. <P>Lichtman also points out that a number of other variables didn't have much effect: the challenging party's nomination contest, adverse reports on candidates' health, running mates and endorsements, among others. "The point," he asserts, "is that elections are less about campaigning than people like to believe, and more about governance. That doesn't mean one party could just stay home, do no campaigning at all, and still win if the keys were in its favor. It does mean, though, that the little ups and downs in the campaigns don't have all that much effect, no matter what the pundits claim. The people are sensible, and they decide based on how well the party in power has governed." <BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=3><B>Does the Long Term Dominate?</B></FONT><BR> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> If the "keys" model is evidence that governance for the four-year term is more important than day-to-day campaign events, are there even longer-term factors that drive cycles of economic disruption and social unrest? Lichtman dismissed political scientist Walter Dean Burnham's theory of a cycle of "critical elections" and major political realignments, at roughly 32- to 36-year intervals. Economists have debated but not widely credited Soviet economist V. I. Kondratiev's theory of a 50-year cycle of inflation and disinflation. Still, the question lingers: Are there long-term processes, not yet identified, that strongly influence political stability? <P>Economist Brian J.L. Berry thinks so. In 1991, he reviewed the previous theories and found patterns of long-wave inflation and disinflation and growth and stagnation seemingly associated with social and political unrest at certain parts of the cycle. He saw the recession of 1990-91, following the stock market crash in 1987, as a recurrence of the deflationary portion of the long wave. Citing technological advances (the telegraph in 1817-1839, electrical generation and transmission in 1870-1890, electronics in 1935-1948) associated with this portion of the cycle previously, he predicted a technology boom that would fuel the next upswing, probably around 2000. Following the pattern, he predicted the next upswing of war for 2000-2025. So far, he does not look far wrong. <P>Like Lichtman, however, Berry is seeking causal mechanisms underlying the pattern, with particular emphasis on what might be done to change the more destructive consequences. He noted that the economic and political safeguards put in place after the Great Depression did, in fact, prevent the 1987 stock market crash from triggering another major depression. Similarly, he argued, improved political and diplomatic safeguards might temper the apparent effect of economic cycles on war and unrest. <P>Some other recent work seems to support his theories. Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, in a systematic review of the different results market capitalism has had in the developed Western World and elsewhere, ascribed the difference to the major differences in legal systems. In the developed Western World, many people have access to the means to acquire capital, while in the Third World the free market tends to benefit small elite populations at the expense of everyone else. This, he argued, puts capitalism and democracy in conflict with one another, rather than supporting each other as they generally do in the developed countries. <P>Yale law professor Amy Chua took the argument still further, claiming that the promotion of free market economies has generated and enriched small ethnic minorities in many parts of the world, especially the Third World. In turn, she asserted, this growing gap between the rich elite and the masses has produced tremendous resentment of democracy, capitalism and the Western World among the majorities in these countries. <P>These theories, especially Chua's, are controversial, to put it mildly, but they are receiving serious attention from historians and social scientists. Certainly the observation that unconstrained capitalism is incompatible with democracy is not new; it has been the basis of antitrust and securities legislation in the United States and other developed countries for more than a century. (Unfortunately, U. S. economists neglected to mention this aspect of U.S.-style capitalism to the Russians after the fall of Soviet Communism, and  as Chua discusses in detail  the results have been notoriously bad.) <P>The association between economic and social alienation and unrest has also been well supported by social science. One of the earliest and still among the best studies was a comparison of militancy of labor unions by Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, done in the early 1950s. They performed a statistical analysis similar to what Lichtman and Keilis-Borok did, expecting to find economic factors that would explain the variation. What they found instead was that an "isolated mass"; that is, a group treated as interchangeable and isolated from the rest of society was much more likely to become militant regardless of other factors. This appears to fit, at least to some extent, with Chua's and de Soto's observations about the effects of too large a gap between the elites and others in a country, and with Berry's suggestions about how to ameliorate the disruptive social and political effects of economic events. <P>The complexity and controversy in this area is a promising opportunity for bold OR/MS analysts. Keynes' analysis of the causative factors for the boom/bust cycle, and policy prescriptions to change the effects, seemed far-fetched to many when first proposed, and Allan Lichtman's "Thirteen Keys" model is still controversial. Nevertheless, as OR/MS analysts should be among the first to insist, if a model produces surprising but verifiable predictions, what should follow is a thorough analysis of the underlying mechanisms. <P>Such analysis would certainly be timely. Burnham's theory of realignment seems to have fallen into disfavor, but it was based on a pattern of recurrence of major social unrest in the United States on about a 35-year cycle. This pattern of unrest looks real  the upheaval of the mid- to late 1960s, the riots and unrest of the early 1930s, the anarchist and anti-industry disruptions of the late 1880s and early 1890s, the violent clashes of the 1850s followed by the Civil War in the early 1860s, and the anti-tax and anti-Federal uprisings of the 1790s all fit the pattern. (The mid-1820s seem calm, but this was a time of political upheaval, as the Democratic-Republican Party split, after nearly 20 years of one-party dominance, over issues of national versus state power, especially in economic issues such as slavery and the national bank.) All can be seen as involving the perceived concentration of too much money and power in too few hands. If there is anything to the pattern, we should know soon; we are due for the next upwelling of social unrest right now! <A NAME="keys"></A> <CENTER><TABLE BORDER="0" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="1" BGCOLOR="#990000" width=440> <TR ALIGN="Center" VALIGN="Middle"> <TD><IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=1 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1> <TABLE BORDER="0" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="6" BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" width=436> <TR ALIGN="Left" VALIGN="Top"> <TD> <CENTER><font color="#990000" size="3" face="verdana, arial, helvetica"><B>The 13 Keys to the Presidency</B></font></CENTER><BR> <font size="2" face="verdana, arial, helvetica"> <B><I>Lichtman's 13 keys:</I></B> <OL> <LI> The incumbent party holds more seats in the U. S. House of Representatives after the midterm election than after the preceding midterm election.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> There is no serious contest for the incumbent-party nomination.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> The incumbent-party candidate is the current president.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> There is no significant third-party or independent candidacy.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> The economy is not in recession during the campaign.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> Real (constant-dollar) per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth for the preceding two terms.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> The administration has effected major policy changes during the term.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> There has been no major social unrest during the term.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> There has been no major military or foreign policy failure during the term.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> There has been a major military or foreign policy success during the term.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> The incumbent-party candidate is charismatic or is a national hero.<BR> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=4 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1><BR> <LI> The challenger is not charismatic and is not a national hero. </OL> <I>If six or more of these statements are false, the incumbent party loses.</I> </TD> </TR> </TABLE> <IMG SRC="art/shim.gif" VSPACE=1 BORDER=0 HEIGHT=1 WIDTH=1> </TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER><BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=3><B>References</B></FONT><BR> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> <OL> <font size=1> <LI> Berry, Brian J. L., 1991, "Long-Wave Rhythms in Economic Development and Political Behavior," Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md. <LI> Burnham, Walter Dean, 1970, "Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics," Norton, New York. <LI> Chua, Amy, 2003, "World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability," Doubleday, New York. <LI> de Soto, Hernando, 2000, "The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else," Basic Books, New York. <LI> Kerr, Clark, and Siegel , Abraham, 1954, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike: An International Comparison," from Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, 1955, "Labor and Management in Industrial Society," McGraw-Hill, New York. <LI> Lichtman, Allan J., 2000, "The Keys to the White House," 2000, Madison Books, Lanham, Md. <LI> Lichtman, Allan J., 1996, "The Keys to the White House," 1996, Madison Books, Lanham, Md. <LI> Lichtman, Allan J., and DeCell, Kenneth, 1990, "The Thirteen Keys to the Presidency," Madison Books, Lanham, Md. <LI> Lichtman, A. J., and Keilis-Borok, V. I., 1981, "Pattern Recognition Applied to Presidential Elections in the United States, 1860-1980: Role of Integral Social, Economic and Political Traits," <I>Proceedings of the National Academy of Science,</I> Vol. 78, No. 11, pp. 7,230-7,234. <LI> Samuelson, Doug, October 2000, "<a href="../orms-10-00/samuelson.html">Gore Wins! At Least That's What the Model Says</a>,"<i> OR/MS Today,</i> pp. 24-26. <LI> Samuelson, Doug, October 1996, "<a href="../orms-10-96/white-house.html">Unlocking the Door to the White House</a>," <I>OR/MS Today,</I> pp. 28-30. </font> </OL> <BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><I><B>Doug Samuelson,</B> a frequent contributor to </I>OR/MS Today,<I> is president of InfoLogix, Inc., a consulting company in Annandale, Va. He worked as a campaign staffer in a U. S. Senate campaign in Nevada in 1970 and as a county coordinator in a gubernatorial campaign in California in 1974. He is a research affiliate of the Ackoff Center for the Advancement of Systems Approaches at the University of Pennsylvania.</i></font><BR>  <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=5 border=0><br>  <img src="../barblue.gif" width=468 height=1 border=0 alt=" "><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <font face="verdana, arial, helvetica" size="1"> <CENTER><script type="text/javascript"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"> </script></CENTER><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <LI> <A HREF="tocfr.html" Target="_top"><I>Table of Contents</A><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <LI> <A HREF="../../ORMS.shtml" TARGET="_top"><I>OR/MS Today</I> Home Page</A><br>  <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <img src="../barblue.gif" width=468 height=1 border=0 alt=" "><br> <b><i>OR/MS Today</i></b> copyright � 2004 by <A HREF="http://www.informs.org/" target="_new">the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences</a>. 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